A typical splash screen activity is designed to provide a smooth user experience while the app loads. In some malware, however, the splash screen’s onCreate() method is modified to immediately launch background threads or asynchronous tasks that execute malicious payloads (for example, contacting a command‐and‐control server, downloading additional modules, or manipulating system settings) while the user is distracted by a seemingly “normal” loading screen.
The Splash Screen Activity is normally a benign part of an Android app—designed to display a logo or brief animation while the app loads its resources. However, some Android malware authors have learned to abuse this component to hide malicious behavior. Here’s how they exploit it:
Malware can embed harmful code into the splash screen activity. While the user sees a familiar or benign loading screen, the malware executes its payload in the background. This might include downloading additional malicious modules, connecting to command-and-control servers, or performing privilege escalation tasks.
Because users expect a splash screen as a natural part of the app startup process, the delay it creates is often not questioned. This window lets the malware complete covert operations before the user even interacts with the main interface, reducing the chance of immediate detection.
In some cases, attackers repurpose or “trojanize” a legitimate app by modifying its splash screen activity to include malicious code. This means that even though the app appears genuine at first glance, the modified splash screen acts as a trigger for harmful behavior.
Since the splash screen is part of the normal user experience, malicious actions that occur during this brief period can slip under the radar of static analysis or initial runtime checks. It makes it more challenging for automated systems and users to detect anything unusual during the early stages of app execution.
Mitigation and Detection:
Code Reviews & Audits: Security researchers and developers should inspect the code behind splash screens, especially in apps from unofficial sources.
Behavioral Analysis: Monitoring network activity and system calls during the splash screen phase can help flag anomalous behaviors.
Strict Permissions: Enforcing least-privilege principles can limit what a malicious splash screen activity is able to do.
In summary, while the splash screen is meant to enhance user experience, its misuse by malware serves as a clever distraction—a period during which malicious operations are quietly executed before the user becomes aware of any issues.
Note: For ethical and legal reasons, this is a representative pseudocode example inspired by published research—not an exact code dump from a real malware sample.
public class SplashScreenActivity extends Activity {
@Override
protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
// Display the benign splash screen
setContentView(R.layout.splash_screen);
// Start a background thread for the malicious payload
new Thread(new Runnable() {
@Override
public void run() {
// Example actions: download additional payload, send device info to C2, etc.
executeMaliciousOperations();
}
}).start();
// Continue to launch the main (apparently legitimate) activity after a delay
new Handler().postDelayed(new Runnable() {
@Override
public void run() {
startActivity(new Intent(SplashScreenActivity.this, MainActivity.class));
finish();
}
}, 3000); // Splash screen delay (e.g., 3 seconds)
}
private void executeMaliciousOperations() {
// [Malicious logic goes here]
// e.g., contact a C2 server, download extra dex code, escalate privileges, etc.
}
}In a real-world malware dropper, similar techniques have been observed—often with the splash screen used as a cover for unpacking and dynamically loading additional malicious dex files. This “multidex dropper” method helps malware evade static analysis since the true payload is only decrypted and loaded at runtime.
While exact code samples from live malware are generally not published in full detail, several technical analyses describe similar techniques:
Recent reports (e.g. from [The Sun, ]) have documented TrickMo variants that use deceptive UI elements (such as fake lock screens or splash screens) to steal PINs and intercept OTPs. These samples illustrate how malicious apps exploit trusted UI moments.
Research such as the [“Anatomy of an Android Malware Dropper” by the EFF, ] and various SOVA analyses (e.g. [SOVA Malware Analysis, ]) have shown that attackers sometimes embed malicious code in early activities—including splash screens—to load additional payloads at runtime.
Studies on dynamic code loading in Android malware (like those discussed in several TryHackMe walkthroughs, ) demonstrate that the splash screen (or early activities) can serve as the point where encrypted or packed dex files are decrypted and injected into memory.
Malware that abuses the splash screen activity leverages the user’s expectation of a benign startup screen to mask early execution of malicious code. The basic idea is to perform harmful operations during that brief window—using background threads, asynchronous tasks, and dynamic class loading—before the main UI appears. While exact code from live malware isn’t published verbatim for safety reasons, the pseudocode above represents the common pattern observed in technical analyses of such threats.
For further technical details and in‐depth analyses, consider reviewing: